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AbstrAct
To attain fundamental reform of the post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a serious debate is need-
ed in 2009/10 that prepares the decisions to be taken in 2011/12. The paper contributes to this debate, first, by 
arguing that the Single Farm Payment should not become the mainstay of the future CAP but be gradually phased 
out. Second, it proposes that the existing two-pillar structure of the CAP should be replaced by a public goods 
pillar (containing all efficient policies to be preserved) and a discretionary pillar (encompassing all inefficient 
policies to be removed over time). This would give member states flexibility in how they phase out inefficient 
policies, while the EU reform agenda would not be clogged with the contentious details of their progressive 
removal. Third, the paper assesses the criteria likely to guide future allocation of CAP payments, such as GDP 
per capita, agricultural and forest areas, and areas with Natura 2000 status. Fourth, it estimates member states’ 
share in total CAP payments under different post-2013 scenarios. This reveals surprising differences between the 
negotiating positions that countries traditionally adopt and the payment receipts they can expect from reform.
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Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has improved considerably since its first ma-
jor reform in 1992. Yet, it still distorts the economy, harms poor farmers abroad, and hands out 
income support to already wealthy recipients. It also fails to effectively address environmental 
challenges, such as the fight against climate change and the preservation of biodiversity. Studies by 
the European Court of Auditors, consultancies, think tanks, universities, and international organi-
zations have repeatedly revealed the weaknesses of the CAP. Civil society stakeholders – ranging 
from environmentalists to pro-development campaigners, from churches to industry federations 
– are almost univocal in their call for CAP reform.2 Only those who significantly profit from CAP 
payments resist change: farmers, landowners, and territories that are net-beneficiaries, paying 
less for the CAP than they receive.
European agricultural policy will not change considerably before 2014 when the next long-term 
framework for the EU budget will come into force.3 But the CAP reform debate cannot wait. 
Fundamental change will grow only on fertile ground. Now is the time to start considering the 
reform alternatives for the next spending period.4
This paper contributes to the debate by examining how CAP reform might affect the distribution 
of subsidies across member states. In the upcoming CAP negotiations, distributional issues will 
be much more visible than in the past. Traditionally, national receipts of CAP subsidies were de-
termined indirectly as member states profited differently from EU-wide intervention prices and 
production support. But now CAP payments are increasingly being distributed through national 
envelopes, that is, entitlements to CAP funds which the member states can then spend with some 
discretion. 
The repartition of these national envelopes is heavily contested. First, many member states urge 
for a thorough redistribution, and the Czech Republic put this issue front and centre of its presi-
dency. The European Commission has expressed understanding for these calls.5 Second, current 
national envelopes are largely determined by past payment patterns rather than by rational crite-
ria reflecting the CAP’s objectives. As the reference periods date further and further back, they 
become ever harder to justify. Third, the current distribution is shaped by the EU enlargement 
process.6 After 2013, a genuinely European approach that removes the old/new member state 
divide is due.
Making distributional effects transparent in advance is important. It will help to turn potential 
reform winners into reform promoters. And it will inspire a serious debate in countries whose 
subsidy receipts will shrink. This may provoke a backslash at first but offer reform-oriented stake-
holders the opportunity to convince the public that the efficiency gains from CAP reform are 
worth the sacrifice. Such an honest debate that concedes that subsidy receipts will fall, while in-
sisting on the overall benefits of reform, can prevent populist detractors from derailing the reform 
process with appeals to narrowly conceived national interests. Last but not least, bringing more 
clarity into the future distribution of CAP payments will help to address other European reform 
challenges. In particular, reform of EU budget financing is contingent on future EU spending: only 
if the distributional consequences of spending reform are understood can politically acceptable 
financing schemes be devised.7
*  The ECIPE Working Paper series presents ongoing research and work in progress. These Working Papers 
might therefore present preliminary results that have not been subject to the usual review process for ECIPE 
publications. We welcome feedback and recommend you to send comments directly to the author(s).3
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While the ultimate objective of the paper is to estimate national envelopes under different re-
form scenarios, several preparatory steps need to be taken first. Section 2 gives an overview of 
the CAP. Section 3 tackles the Single Farm Payment (SFP). This payment is not linked to farmers’ 
current production but based on historic entitlements. Since opinions on the future of this heavy 
weight in the CAP budget diverge strongly, its case needs to be examined before any estimate of 
future payment allocations can be undertaken. Looking at economic, environmental, and social 
consequences, as well as farmers’ possibly legitimate expectations on policy stability, the paper 
concludes that the SFP lacks any justification and will be increasingly under pressure.
Section 4 looks at an alternative CAP structure that could replace the current two-pillar frame-
work. This is an important issue because the overarching structure member states choose for the 
future CAP is likely to have repercussions on the allocation of payments. The paper proposes to 
divide the CAP into one ‘discretionary pillar’ of inefficient policies to be gradually phased out and 
one pillar for policies that efficiently promote public goods. 
Section 5 examines approaches to allocating the CAP after 2013. A fresh take on the issue is neces-
sary because no clear guidance can be derived from past practice. The paper makes the case for a 
number of criteria, such as agricultural area, forest area, and area with Natura 2000 status. 
Section 6 gauges how member states would fare under different scenarios. It proposes allocation 
formulae drawing on the criteria elaborated before and assesses the resulting distribution of CAP 
payments across member states. Several scenarios are constructed – some where the current two-
pillar framework is upheld and others where an alternative structure is introduced. 
The concluding section summarizes the arguments and highlights differences between the ne-
gotiating positions that countries traditionally adopt and the subsidy levels they can expect from 
reform. Some reform skeptics would be well advised to second-think their defensive posture, 
while some member states promoting reform should acknowledge possible losses.
2. the current cAP
Before considering policy changes, the current CAP – its instruments, structure, and expen-
ditures – shall be presented. The CAP encompasses a broad range of instruments. Table 1 presents 
a brief description with some examples. 
tAble 1: cAP instruments
instrument exAmPle
market intervention mechanisms that raise the price on 
the European market
public intervention buying, export subsidies
coupled subsidies that reward the production of a 
specific good based on output or utilized area
suckler cow, goat, and sheep premia
direct income support SFP, early retirement schemes
subsidies that increase farm productivity farm modernization, training
subsidies efficiently targeted at public goods that pro-
mote agriculture's services to society
well-designed agri-environmental payments, research 
into sustainable farming 
subsidies that pretend to promote public goods but 
whose principal effect is to channel income support to 
farmers
Least Favored Area payments, poorly designed agri-
environmental payments
rural development subsidies unrelated to agriculture village renovation, economic diversification4
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The CAP is not directly organized along these instruments but divided into two pillars. One dif-
ference between them is that expenses under the first pillar are fully covered by the EU, whereas 
member states have to co-finance second pillar programs. In addition, the pillars focus on dif-
ferent instruments. While almost any of the CAP instruments can be financed under the first 
pillar, its emphasis is clearly on market intervention, coupled subsidies, and the SFP. It can thus 
be described as a farm-income-and-production pillar. Farm modernization, genuine and abusive 
public goods programs, and rural development are mostly supported through the second pillar. 
A further distinction, besides the issue of co-financing, can thus be drawn. The first pillar tends to 
entail relatively blunt measures whose implementation is similar or identical across the EU. The 
second pillar, by contrast, relies on member states’ micro-management (in cooperation with the 
European Commission that controls programming and monitors implementation). Finally, it can 
be noted that the second pillar contains more effective policies than the first – but not all second 
pillar policies are justifiable and not all first pillar policies are detrimental. Table 2 summarizes 
the main characteristics of the two pillars.
tAble 2: chArActeristics of the cAP PillArs
first PillAr second PillAr
financing fully EU financed co-financed by member states
main instruments market intervention, coupled subsidies, SFP farm modernization, genuine and abusive 
public goods programs, rural development
standardization  rather homogeneous across EU very heterogeneous across EU
eu value creation mostly very low from very low to very high
Table 3 shows the expenditures for key CAP instruments for the period 2006-2008. These are 
market intervention, coupled subsidies, decoupled direct aids (SFP and equivalent payments in 
the new member states), and second pillar payments.
tAble 3: cAP exPenditures for key instruments (in € million)
2006 2007 2008
market intervention 8,148 4,867 4,159
coupled subsidies 17,893 6,259 5,620
decoupled direct aids 15,975 30,369 31,208
second pillar 7,719 10,874 10,529
Source: Yearly Reports on Budgetary and Financial Management, DG Budget
Data on second pillar payments reflects the execution of payment appropriations
It can be seen that the SFP (used in the following to refer to all decoupled direct aids) takes up the 
lion’s share in the budget. The 2008 Health Check reform has further strengthened the SFP by 
cutting back future market intervention and coupled subsidies. For 2013, the first pillar budget 
is forecasted to be at €45.0 billion, to be dedicated mostly to the SFP, and the second pillar to 
amount to €14.8 billion.8 Any CAP reform will thus have to start with a decision on the future 
of the SFP.
3. the future of the sfP
The SFP has been introduced in 2003 as a compensation for the removal of previous subsidies 5
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coupled with production. What should be done with this compensation after 2013 when it will 
have been paid for an entire decade? Has the time come for immediate abolition or is some tran-
sition more appropriate? Leaving the question of political feasibility aside, three welfare consid-
erations – economic, environmental, and social – can inform this choice. In addition, whether 
farmers hold legitimate expectations that the SFP will be continued is an issue that needs to be 
examined. Food (in)security, which is often adduced to justify the SFP, is not considered here 
because it is not a serious threat to the EU.9 
3.1 EConomIC EFFECTS
Though the SFP is formally decoupled from production, it still distorts production through 
several mechanisms.10 This prevents market signals from directing the economy’s resources to 
their most productive uses.
Credit: If farmers do not have access to all the credit they would like to have, the SFP increases 
output by easing capital constraints. First, farmers can directly channel the payments into produc-
tion. Second, farmers gain better access to credit by reducing bankruptcy risks and driving up 
land values that can serve as collateral.11
Structure: Farms that would not be viable in a free market may stay in business if part of their 
costs can be financed through support programs.12 This distorts the structure of production (in 
favor of less efficient producers, whether small or large) and keeps an excessive share of labor in 
agriculture. Another distortion is that young farmers who do not inherit farm land find it harder 
to set up a farm as the SFP drives up land values.
Cross compliance: The SFP obliges farmers to maintain their land in good agricultural and en-
vironmental conditions (see below). Some of these conditions, such as avoiding the encroachment 
of unwanted vegetation, are easiest to fulfill by farming. The SFP thus pushes farmers indirectly 
to produce.
Another issue is the administrative cost of doling out farm payments. Ministries and agencies 
have to set detailed rules, verify entitlements and compliance, decide on individual claims, and 
process payments.13 Farmers need to inform themselves, engage consultants, file applications, 
and cooperate in official controls. The costs – for farmers alone – have been estimated to be 6.7 
% of CAP payments disbursed in France, while administration costs amount to 8.5% in Italy and 
9.3% in Germany. Germany also stands out with €28 of administration costs for farmers per 
hectare of farm land.14
Costs arise not only from distributing but also from raising public money. Some of these costs are 
evident, such as the cost of running finance ministries and filling in tax declarations. The more 
insidious distortions brought about by taxes are less visible: citizens work less, save less, and invest 
less in their education if taxes are high. Companies also invest less in high tax countries.
To be acceptable, the SFP would therefore have to produce highly desirable results in the envi-
ronmental or social realm. These benefits would have to outweigh the economic distortions the 
SFP produces as well as its administration and financing costs.
3.2 EnvIRonmEnTAL EFFECTS
Agricultural production can preserve open spaces, enhance scenic variety, and maintain 
traditional landscape characteristics that carry cultural significance. Similarly, agriculture can 6
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promote biodiversity, for instance by offering a habitat to species that depend on (traditional) 
farming. But agriculture can also lead to water, air, and soil pollution; release of greenhouse gases; 
water and soil depletion; and the loss of biological diversity as a result of environmental degra-
dation and monoculture.15 There is no reason to think that the SFP, to the extent that it simply 
stimulates agricultural production, does more harm than good to the environment.16
Admittedly, the SFP is subject to cross-compliance: farmers need to adhere to statutory manage-
ment requirements (SMR) and to maintain their land in good agricultural and environmental 
condition (GAEC). The European Court of Auditors has recently lambasted these provisions for 
the following reasons:17 
their objectives are underspecified and neither the Commission nor the member states  •	
monitor their effectiveness, 
they overlap with compulsory obligations (so that many farmers do not have to under- •	
take any action beyond respecting the law),
some member states have failed to specify the vague EU cross-compliance conditions  •	
so as to make them fully operational within their borders
member states control cross-compliance with insufficient frequency and excessive  •	
laxity (finding not a single infringement in thousands of controls for important condi-
tions), and they impose ludicrous sanctions.
This makes it unreasonable to expect significant environmental benefits from the SFP – despite 
the cross-compliance mechanism.18 Even if one believes that the SFP brings a marginal net gain for 
the environment, it would be much preferable to invest that money into targeted environmental 
payments. Such schemes can reward the maintenance of buffer strips, hedges, and stone walls or 
set incentives for the reduction of fertilizer and crop protection chemicals.
3.3 SoCIAL EFFECTS
Farmers as a group are not a good target for income transfers. In some countries, they have 
above-average incomes, and in most countries, their average incomes have been increasing in 
recent years. This trend is likely to continue in the future: output prices are forecasted to move 
on a long-term upward trend and labor is leaving agriculture, raising the earnings of those who 
remain in the sector.19 
Moreover, farmers are asset-rich: they own machinery, farm buildings, and above all land. It is 
difficult to justify why people who own a lot should receive public money – even if they have low 
incomes yet do not wish to sell any of their property. Do the working poor of other sectors not 
have a better claim to public support as they are both income- and asset-poor?
Still another reason why the SFP does not make sense as a social policy is that poor households 
benefit little. 20% of SFP recipients reap roughly 80% of the SFP.20 In the Czech Republic, the 
average beneficiary receives almost € 50,000.21 Table 4 shows the distribution of the SFP in the 
EU-25 in 2007 according to the size of individual SFP receipts. It can be seen, for example, that 
13.66% of the total SFP goes to farmers that receive between €50,000 and €100,000, and that 
27.41% cumulatively goes to farmers with at least €50,000 SFP receipts.7
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tAble 4: distribution of the sfP Across fArmers
IndIvIdUAL SFP RECEIPTS % oF ToTAL SFP CUmULATIvE % oF ToTAL SFP
≥ 0 and < 500 € 2.22 100,00
≥ 500 and < 1 250 € 3.45 97.79
≥ 1 250 and < 2 000 € 2.66 94.34
≥ 2 000 and < 5 000 € 8.49 91.68
≥ 5 000 and < 10 000 € 11.31 83.19
≥ 10 000 and < 20 000 € 17.12 71.88
≥ 20 000 and < 50 000 € 27.35 54.76
≥ 50 000 and < 100 000 € 13.66 27.41
≥ 100 000 and < 200 000 € 6.55 13.75
≥ 200 000 and < 300 000 € 2.29 7.20
≥ 300 000 and < 500 000 € 2.17 4.91
≥ 500 000 € 2.74 2.74
Source: ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fin/directaid/2007/annex1_en.pdf
If public aid is meant to minimize poverty, it should be directly linked to poverty and not be con-
ditional on agricultural employment or land ownership.
3.4 LEgITImATE ExPECTATIonS
Farmers’ legitimate expectations about policy stability could in principle justify an incre-
mentalist approach to phasing out the SFP. However, any such argument is flawed under the par-
ticular circumstances of the SFP. One major reason for this is that the SFP is formally decoupled 
from current production decisions. This means that farmers’ long-term business decisions about 
investing into farm buildings and machinery, and more generally about whether to stay in farm-
ing, should be largely independent of the SFP (though not fully, as seen above). The SFP is not 
designed to change farmers’ business behavior in order to attain societal objectives, so that they 
could complain if the public changes its mind. The SFP cannot be compared to a policy commit-
ment such as that of the creation of an EU carbon emission market that triggers massive specific 
investments. In the case of the SFP, there are no policy-induced long-term investments that would 
have to be protected.
Besides, when farmers were granted the SFP in 2003, they had to know that this subsidy would 
not last forever. The preceding two decades had seen repeated reform attempts, which had regu-
larly fallen short of the reformers’ ambitions, and the next CAP reform had already been sched-
uled for 2008. Both in 2003 and 2008, the Commission had tried to shift far more money from 
the SFP to rural development and environmental payments than what was finally agreed. Between 
these two reforms waited another threat to the SFP: the negotiations of the financial framework 
for 2007-2013 which could very well have led to drastic cuts in the CAP budget. More gener-
ally, compensation payments necessary to facilitate reform at one point in time usually have a 
deadline. The fact that this deadline was not specified in the 2003 and 2008 reforms should not 
give reason to believe that they would go on forever. In short, farmers got a very attractive SFP 
in 2003 and the subsequent budget and CAP negotiations, surprisingly, extended this payment 




4. the future structure of the cAP
One approach to CAP reform is to take the existing two pillar structure for granted. This has 
been done by the 2008 Health Check reform that has shifted money from the first to the second 
pillar, re-calibrated the first pillar (reducing coupled subsidies and market intervention while 
expanding the SFP and public goods payments), and focused the second pillar more strongly on 
public goods (through the so-called ‘new challenges’). The alternative approach is to redefine the 
entire structure before setting spending priorities.
The current CAP structure is incoherent in several regards making it desirable to start from 
scratch when deciding on Europe’s long-term agricultural policies. As seen in Section 2, the pil-
lars partially overlap in the policies they permit,22 and even the second pillar subsidizes programs 
that do not create value for the EU. In addition, the fully EU-funded first pillar is an anomaly that 
contradicts the principles of leveraging EU funds and improving spending discipline through co-
financing. Besides mending these substantive flaws, a new beginning could also be a strategically 
smart choice: radical re-allocation to efficient uses may be easier in the more dynamic context of 
a new structure than within the boundaries of the existing framework. 
That radical changes are indeed necessary has been shown in Section 3. That old-fashioned market 
intervention and coupled subsidies are counterproductive has long been accepted by most parties. 
But a switch to the SFP is not the right solution. Neither economic, environmental, and social 
welfare considerations nor respect for legitimate expectations about policy stability can justify 
continuation of the SFP after 2013. The SFP was created in 2003 to facilitate CAP reform – it has 
been a way to buy support from farm lobbies for a policy that is economically less distorting than 
its predecessor but still wastes public money. This initial and unique raison-d’être has lapsed.
The structure proposed below is only one of many conceivable alternatives to the status quo – 
albeit a particularly interesting one. The advantages of this structure suggest that the possibility of 
a new structure in one form or another needs to be taken seriously. Even if a new structure will 
differ in some aspects from the one developed here, the basic principle of introducing one pillar 
that is genuinely concerned with public goods may well impose itself (and this is the element that 
will matter for the allocation criteria and the modeling in the subsequent sections).
4.1 dISCRETIonARy And PUBLIC goodS PILLAR
The proposed structure would divide the CAP into a discretionary and a public goods pillar. 
The discretionary pillar would be progressively phased out, while the public goods pillar would 
be preserved. Member states would be free to shift as much money as they want from their dis-
cretionary to their public goods envelope.23
Under the discretionary pillar, member states could finance all the inefficient instruments aimed 
at supporting farm income and production: the SFP and other income support, coupled pay-
ments, and payments for improving farm productivity. Member states would be free to decide 
how much of this money they use for what kind of subsidy as long as they stay within certain limits. 
One of the main challenges would be to think of such safeguards that prevent serious distortions 
without unduly restricting flexibility.24 Member states could also choose how they distribute 
the SFP and other income support among farmers. Instruments that have been co-financed by 
member states under the second pillar in the past would continue to be co-financed under the 
discretionary pillar.25 
The other pillar would be dedicated exclusively to public goods related to agriculture. It would 9
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thus be narrower than the current second pillar, excluding farm modernization (as long as it does 
not significantly contribute to public goods), abusive public goods payments, and rural develop-
ment programs without a clear link to agriculture. The latter two types of instruments would 
be removed from the CAP altogether. Payments that pretend to promote public goods but are 
actually designed to channel income support to farmers would be eliminated – to the extent that 
is practically possible – by enhancing EU oversight of programming and stricter EU monitoring 
of implementation. Rural development payments unrelated to agriculture would – to the extent 
that their continuation is justified by a European interest – be merged into other EU policies. 
4.2 AdvAnTAgES oF ThE nEW STRUCTURE
Such a solution would have several attractive features: it would focus the reform debate on 
the central challenge – promoting public goods – and relegate quarrels over the treatment of 
specific inefficient instruments to the sidelines; it would grant governments flexibility in tailoring 
income support so as to make reform politically feasible; it would permit shifting a maximum 
of payments to public goods; and it would result in a clean public goods pillar rather than a dirty 
second pillar.
Political focus on public goods: The objectives of agricultural payments would play a greater 
role in the debate on future CAP allocation if a new structure were introduced. This is, first, 
because past reforms have seen repeated fighting over the transfer of money from the first to the 
second pillar. Any discussion within the old framework will thus elicit deep-rooted support or 
resistance, while the merits of the final use of the money would remain underappreciated. Second, 
difficulties likely to arise over the reform of specific inefficient policy instruments could be side-
stepped. If, for instance, the few remaining coupled payments cannot easily be removed at the 
next reform step, it appears pragmatic not to wage a fight over this issue but to permit states to 
continue existing coupled payments drawing on their discretionary envelopes. Other examples in 
the same vein are the Less Favored Area scheme and most farm modernization payments. Third, 
distributional conflicts about the distribution of the SFP to farmers could be shifted to national 
level. Past attempts by the Commission to change how member states allocate the SFP to farmers 
have fared poorly. In 2003, the Commission failed to introduce ‘progressive’ modulation (i.e. a 
shift from the first to the second pillar that hits large SFP recipients harder), and the progressive 
component in the 2009 modulation falls far short of the Commission’s initial proposals. It is pref-
erable to eschew the complexity of European negotiations on increasing progressive modulation 
or on ending the historical model for SFP allocation to farmers.26 Fourth, granting the member 
states a discretionary envelope avoids part of the pro-reform energy being wasted on pushing for 
an allocation of the SFP that favors small and poor farmers.27 It also ensures against the danger of 
some improvements in this sense being instrumentalized to hail a mediocre reform as a victory.
Flexibility to target the discretionary envelope at political constraints: Governments 
could use the enhanced leeway in allocating the SFP, together with other income support and 
farm productivity programs, so as to best respond to the social and political circumstances on the 
ground.28 In this way, they could direct the money to those farmers whose losses from reform 
are a binding constraint on reform.
Flexibility to shift payments to public goods: Every country could shift as much money 
away from the SFP as is possible under its political constellation. First, more progressive coun-
tries that want to make efficient use of public money can adopt bolder phase-out strategies. If, 
by contrast, EU funds were to be dedicated to a first pillar with a limited scope for public good 
policies, more money would go to the SFP than necessary: even those countries that would prefer 10
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to promote public goods would attempt to get as much EU-funded first pillar money as possible. 
Second, a discretionary envelope permits flexibility over time. Countries can thus transfer ad-
ditional money to public good policies, for instance as water shortages call for investments in 
water-saving farming practices. 
Clean public goods pillar instead of dirty second pillar: Introducing a new public goods 
pillar instead of attempting to prune the existing second pillar is likely to produce better results. 
The current array of permissible second pillar payments is excessively broad and the quality of 
spending deplorable.29 In the future, the second pillar would run the risk of being abused even 
more blatantly as the official farm income support instruments are being curtailed. The result 
could be worse than the SFP, with higher transaction costs in administration and greater distor-
tions.30 The necessary fresh start would be easier with a formal transition to a new public goods 
pillar requiring a principled debate without any priors. Furthermore, the leeway granted under 
the discretionary pillar to temporarily continue established, ineffective policies would facilitate 
a rigorous selection of policies that qualify for the public goods pillar.
4.3 SFP ToP-UPS
Governments would be free to top up the SFP beyond what their discretionary envelopes can 
pay for. This is already permitted for the new member states that receive relatively few decoupled 
direct aids (under the Single Area Payment Scheme). In the future, all member states would have 
this right, albeit within limits that decrease over time. 
A first advantage would be to ease pressure on the EU budget by allowing member states to assist 
farmers. The discretionary pillar could be scaled back more quickly if additional national money 
can compensate farmers. Furthermore, such a move would shift political pressure from the Eu-
ropean to the national level. The SFP lobby will direct part of its resources at their government 
to secure additional transition payments instead of throwing their entire weight into blocking 
EU-level reform. And finally, such a solution would unmask the hypocrisy of those governments 
that argue for the vital functions of the SFP as long as it is paid for by Brussels but refuse to shift 
parts of the expenses to their national budgets.
4.4 SIngLE mARkET
There is no reason to fear additional distortions to the single market, neither from the introduc-
tion of the discretionary pillar nor from the possibility to top up the SFP. Compared to the cur-
rent situation, the absolute differences in payment levels of possibly distorting policies would be 
falling as payment levels decrease over time: if farmers in comparable situations get €20,000 and 
€10,000 respectively today, this is more worrisome than the gap between €5,000 and €2,500 
in the future. What is more, the EU-funded base SFP is likely to be distributed more equally than 
the current SFP.31 Finally, current distortions would be scaled back by cutting farm modernization 
payments (indirectly, by placing them in the discretionary envelope) that are employed highly 
unevenly across the member states. In sum, the proposed structure would level an already skewed 
playing field.
5. criteriA for the AllocAtion of cAP PAyments
So far, it has been argued that fundamental change in the CAP instruments is necessary – includ-
ing a phase-out of the SFP – and that this could best be achieved by also modifying the structure 11
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of the CAP. If change in instruments and possibly also structure materializes, this will increase 
the chances that the distribution of CAP funds across countries will also be adapted. This section 
looks at how national envelopes have been allocated in the past, and it discusses criteria that could 
reasonably shape allocation of future CAP payments. 
The assumption that future distribution, compared to past practice, will be guided more by ra-
tional criteria and less by historic subsidy receipts is plausible. Any change on the scale to be ex-
pected is hard to imagine without a principled approach. Also, the structural funds – comparable 
to the CAP in size and nature – are assigned according to a distribution key determined by policy 
objectives. The arbitrary allocation of CAP payments relying on increasingly outdated reference 
periods is thus an anomaly likely to be corrected.
5.1 FIRST PILLAR/dISCRETIonARy EnvELoPES
Past allocation
When the SFP was introduced in 2003, the money that was freed up by removing subsidies that 
had hitherto been coupled to production was transferred to national SFP envelopes in accord-
ance with member states’ previous receipts of coupled subsidies.32 Member states enjoyed some 
latitude in how they distributed the SFP to farmers. They could choose between three models: 
the historic model, where payments correspond to the level of subsidies each farmer had received 
during the 2000-2002 reference period; the regional model, where governments define one or 
several regions within their borders and pay a regionally fixed rate per hectare that has been eligi-
ble for subsidies during the 2000-2002 reference period; and a hybrid model that combines these 
two approaches. Payments were to be reduced by 3% in 2005, 4% in 2006, and 5% in every year 
thereafter. The money generated through such modulation was to be transferred to the second pil-
lar of the CAP. The way the money was to be allocated to countries was supposed to take account 
of agricultural area, agricultural employment, and GDP per capita in purchasing power. However, 
at least 80% of the money should remain in the country where it has been generated.
The 2008 Health Check maintained this approach although there were complaints about unjust 
and outdated national envelopes, notably from Eastern Europe. The additional money freed up 
through reinforced modulation (gradually rising to 10% in 2012 for payments above EUR 5,000, 
plus an extra 4% for amounts exceeding EUR 300,000) was again shifted to rural development.
Table 5 shows the disparity of the national first pillar envelopes. At the top comes Greece with 
an astonishing €544 per hectare; at the bottom is Latvia with a meager €83. The 2013 figures 
reflect the first year when the new member states receive their full envelopes – until then, they 
are getting even less as their payments are progressively phased in.33 The data sources for this and 
all the following tables can be found in the annex.12
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tAble 5: 2013 AllocAtion of first PillAr enveloPes
mEmBER STATES € mILLIon % ShARE PER hA
Austria 752 1.65 236
Belgium 615 1.35 447
denmark 1,049 2.30 394
Finland 571 1.25 249
France 8,521 18.70 310
germany 5,853 12.84 346
greece 2,217 4.86 544
Ireland 1,341 2.94 324
Italy 4,370 9.59 343
Luxembourg 37 0.08 283
netherlands 898 1.97 469
Portugal 606 1.33 174
Spain 5,139 11.28 206
Sweden 771 1.69 247
United kingdom 3,988 8.75 247
eu-15 36,727 80.58 295
Bulgaria 742 1.63 243
Cyprus 53 0.12 366
Czech Republic 909 1.99 258
Estonia 101 0.22 112
hungary 1,319 2.89 312
Latvia 146 0.32 83
Lithuania 380 0.83 143
malta 5 0.01 494
Poland 3,045 6.68 197
Romania 1,620 3.55 118
Slovakia 388 0.85 200
Slovenia 144 0.32 295
eu-12 8,853 19.42 185
Bulgaria and Romania: 2015 entitlements
Future allocation
The same factors can be expected to determine distribution independently of whether member 
states hold on to the current two-pillar structure or move to the proposed new structure. Neither 
the first nor the discretionary pillar is targeted at public goods; their distribution will be shaped 
by the staying power of old entitlements, concerns over distortions in the common market, and 
fairness considerations.
Three criteria, in particular, look likely to influence future allocation of the first pillar/discretion-
ary envelopes: The greater the 2013 first pillar envelope, the greater the agricultural area, and 
the higher the GDP per capita, the greater the future envelope. Even if member states will not 
formally follow an allocation formula, one can expect results to reflect these criteria.13
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2013 first pillar envelope: The official argument will go that a country with a large first pil-
lar envelope in 2013 will have to pay a relatively substantial amount of income-supporting and 
productivity-increasing subsidies after 2013 in order to avoid hardship and appease farm protests. 
This issue could in principle be addressed when reforming EU budget financing by (temporarily) 
lowering contributions of those countries whose first pillar envelopes are sharply reduced. But 
since governments find it difficult to shift money within their budget, some responsiveness to past 
payment levels can be expected. The real importance of 2013 first pillar envelopes will be based 
on bargaining power: the old distribution will serve as starting point for negotiations, and those 
who favor change will be the demandeurs.
Agricultural area: One justification for this criterion is that differences in support levels per 
hectare across farmers threaten to distort competition. Even if distortions are considered to be 
small, the argument that agricultural area should be rewarded similarly across Europe appeals to 
basic ideas of equality and the spirit of European integration. In addition, CAP beneficiaries are 
claiming that even the first/discretionary pillar promotes public goods. To the extent that this as-
sertion wields influence, agricultural area commands supplementary legitimacy as an allocation 
criterion since the creation of public goods is roughly proportional to agricultural area.34
GDP per capita: In richer member states, wages in non-agricultural jobs that are comparable to 
agricultural employment are higher. So a higher level of income support is needed to ascertain a 
fair standard of living for farmers and prevent land abandonment. Furthermore, flattening income 
support across Europe without taking account of differences in GDP per capita would lead to 
excessively high support in poor member states and thus increase distortions in the economy. The 
inclusion of GDP per capita may be resented for contradicting the principle of European solidar-
ity. But agricultural policies should not become a tool for accelerating economic convergence in 
Europe. Structural policies are more effective to this end.35
Agricultural employment appears not to be a suitable candidate for guiding future subsidy al-
location. The main formal reason against it is that farmers’ entitlements to the SFP are based on 
land independently of the workforce they employ. Maintaining coherence between domestic and 
European distributional criteria is appealing. Furthermore, Romania and Poland each hold close 
to twenty percent of the EU’s total of ‘agricultural work units’. They would thus seize significant 
shares of CAP funds from other member states. Since these two countries do not wield sufficient 
bargaining power in the EU to push through such a result (especially as they are strong net ben-
eficiaries of the CAP and the EU budget in any case), inclusion of agricultural employment as a 
determinant of subsidy allocation is unlikely. A final obstacle arises over measurement issues.
Agricultural output is even less appropriate as an allocation criterion. In principled terms, this 
would run afoul of the very idea of the Single Farm Payment: decoupling from production. And 
from a pragmatic point of view, such a criterion would favor more productive member states 
whose farmers tend to have less difficulty in surviving without income support. It would also be 
counterproductive because it would entice governments to stimulate production (by maintain-
ing a maximum of coupled payments or investing in farm modernization) rather than promote 
less intensive, environmentally friendly farming. So there are convincing arguments against the 
inclusion of an output criterion – and little speaking in favor it. In particular, food security cannot 
serve as a justification. First, the instruments of the first/discretionary pillar are not geared to 
enhance food security; the SFP as its main component is explicitly decoupled from production. 
Second, food security is not at risk in the EU.3614
ECIPE WORKING PAPER
No. 08/2009
5.2 SECond PILLAR/PUBLIC goodS EnvELoPES
Past allocation
The guidelines for the distribution of rural development payments under the second pillar 
are vague, pointing to regional convergence objectives, historic levels of rural development pay-
ments, and undefined particular situations and needs as determinants.37 The actual distribution 
of rural development payments for 2007-2013 largely reflects member states’ 2000-2006 pay-
ments. In the EU-15, these payments were made under the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund. Their level is itself based on rural development payments and commitments in 
the 1994-99 period (under various schemes, e.g. the EU’s regional policy objective 5b). The new 
member states received separate payments until 2006 under the Special Accession Programme 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (Sapard). These were calculated according to farming 
population, agricultural area, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power, and 
the specific territorial situation.38 But the 2007-2013 distribution has also been driven by the 
political dynamics of the December 2005 European Council (rather than by criteria related to the 
objectives of the second pillar). The resulting distribution can be seen in table 6.39
tAble 6: 2013 AllocAtion of second PillAr enveloPes
mEmBER STATES € mILLIon % ShARE PER hA
Austria 511 4.00 160
Belgium 54 0.43 40
denmark 62 0.48 23
Finland 272 2.13 118
France 906 7.10 33
germany 1,131 8.86 67
greece 619 4.85 152
Ireland 307 2.41 74
Italy 1,258 9.86 99
Luxembourg 12 0.09 90
netherlands 67 0.52 35
Portugal 564 4.42 162
Spain 1,041 8.16 42
Sweden 239 1.87 77
United kingdom 267 2.09 17
eu-15 7,310 57.27 59
Bulgaria 396 3.10 130
Cyprus 21 0.16 144
Czech Republic 418 3.27 119
Estonia 113 0.89 125
hungary 579 4.53 137
Latvia 151 1.18 85
Lithuania 254 1.99 96
malta 11 0.08 1,032
Poland 1,850 14.49 120
Romania 1,233 9.66 90
Slovakia 317 2.49 164
Slovenia 112 0.88 229




Which criteria could determine the distribution of the second pillar/public goods envelopes 
in the future? This depends partly on whether the old or a new structure will prevail (see below). 
It also depends on which public goods will be promoted.40 There are four prominent categories 
of public goods argued to be dependent on agriculture: rural development, food security, the 
environment, and food safety and animal welfare.
Regarding rural development, it is questionable whether governments should influence where 
people work and live. But even if one believes that it is a worthy objective to conserve existing 
settlement structures against the changing preferences of the population, one should not resort 
primarily to agricultural policies. Efficient approaches to promoting rural development would be 
non-discriminatory across sectors. This is the case with investment into infrastructure and educa-
tion. Alternatively, they would be targeted at the particular potential of each region, depending on 
its location, natural and cultural richness, entrepreneurial spirit, or existing industrial and service 
structure. Finally and decisively, rural development is not a European public good. If countries 
wish to subsidize a more decentralized settlement structure, this is a national choice that will not 
significantly affect European welfare.
Food security is not threatened in the EU. The EU has the purchasing power to source supplies 
from the world market. In the case of persistent and severe production shortfalls within the EU 
combined with a blockade of food imports, countries could easily expand cultivated areas, use 
more intensive farming methods and shift production patterns to increase yields. In particular, 
curbing the production of meat, milk, and biofuels could free up capacity for growing basic grains. 
51 million hectares were used as pastures and permanent meadows in 2005, compared to 100 
million hectares of arable land; in addition, much arable land serves feed stuff production. 
Whereas rural development and food security do not qualify for EU intervention, several Euro-
pean public goods can be identified in the environmental field. 
The fight against climate change is a joint European challenge that goes beyond allocat- •	
ing national emission ceilings to the member states. Since monitoring the implementa-
tion of emission trading in agriculture is difficult, payments may be needed to incline 
farmers to go beyond legal minimum requirements. 
The protection of biodiversity is an EU task. Animals cross borders, and so does bi- •	
odiversity-threatening pollution. Besides, preserving biodiversity in Europe can be 
thought of as a European responsibility on the global stage. 
One can argue that the EU shares an interest in the amenity value of its landscapes.  •	
Most benefits of a diverse, traditional, well-kept landscape will be reaped within the 
country – by direct enjoyment, as an advantage to attract qualified human resources, 
or through tourism. Still, travelers may not pay for all the pleasure they take in the 
landscapes of other member states. 
The risk of floods is influenced by agriculture. What farmers grow and where, how they  •	
manage their soils, how they handle water courses, such issues are crucial for flood con-
trol. And since rivers cross borders, the case for a European dimension can be made.
Another argument for payments is that they can help farmers to implement EU legislation on 
food safety and animal welfare. There might exist a common EU interest in such assistance in 
order to enable more demanding legislation – without driving agricultural production to foreign 
low-standard suppliers – and to enhance compliance. Consumers who almost inevitably eat food 16
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from different areas of the common market, and animal rights promoters whose feelings do not 
stop at borders, stand to benefit.
It is questionable whether this justification is valid or whether farmers should incur the full costs 
of compliance with EU legislation (according to the polluter pays principle). Several considera-
tions speak against leakage of production to foreign countries with less demanding environmental 
standards. First, imported food must in any case meet many of the EU’s standards, notably those 
on human, animal, and plant health. Second, the additional costs of complying with environmen-
tal standards in agriculture appear generally moderate. Even with regard to animal welfare, where 
compliance costs are particularly high and cannot largely be recuperated through price premia, 
pressures to relocate production are mostly minor.41 Third, land is a key factor of production 
specific to agriculture – and one that cannot be moved abroad. This limits the extent to which 
domestic production will be replaced by foreign production. 
If some agricultural production is transferred in response to high EU standards, this is not inevi-
tably undesirable. Most environmental problems caused by agriculture are local (for instance, 
ground water pollution or soil erosion). It is therefore efficient that every country decides on the 
environmental standards that best conform to its level of development and other characteristics, 
such as population density and non-agricultural sources of environmental pollution. Even where 
a global public good is concerned, such as biodiversity or the climate, it is not clear whether a 
country with higher standards has indeed a better environmental performance. A country with 
relatively high environmental standards may at the same time employ relatively polluting pro-
duction techniques – for instance because land is scarcer while agro-chemicals and machines are 
cheaper than in other countries, or because its cold climate requires using energy to keep animals 
in stables while animals can graze freely in other countries throughout the year. A transfer of pro-
duction to countries with lower standards is not necessarily harmful to the global environmental 
commons. 
It is therefore unlikely that food safety and animal welfare will be a dominant factor in the distri-
bution of future CAP payments. It may, however, come into play as a supporting argument for 
certain allocation criteria.
In order to derive the optimal allocation of EU public goods funds for environmental – and 
possibly food safety and animal welfare – objectives, one has to determine for each country 1) 
to what extent these goods would be undersupplied without EU funding, 2) how valuable their 
supply is for the EU, and 3) how effective EU payments are in promoting their supply. Since EU 
decision-makers will never ascertain these factors, the distribution of EU public goods funds can 
be assumed to follow some simple criteria.42 
Such criteria will have to rest on an unambiguous justification. This makes it improbable that 
member states will agree on a GDP-based criterion. The ambivalence in this regard is that, on 
the one hand, one can make a case in favor of investing a relatively large amount of EU resources 
in poor countries where the production of public goods is relatively cheap (turning Bulgaria and 
Romania into biodiversity havens and carbon sinks). On the other hand, relatively high levels of 
EU payments are needed to encourage farmers in rich member states to produce a minimum 
supply of public goods. Due to this ambivalence, differences in GDP will preferably be accounted 
for through differentiated co-financing rates.
Furthermore, allocation criteria will have to be easily applicable and resistant to abusive claims. 
Highly targeted allocation to the member states that have the greatest need or that are undertak-
ing the greatest effort to advance European public goods is thus not workable. For instance, one 17
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might believe that high nature value areas deserve additional EU funding. The problem with such 
a criterion is that it would be poorly defined and open to abuse, leading to inextricable disputes 
during reform negotiations and resulting in a distorted allocation.43 The past experience of an EU 
average of 57% of agricultural area declared as Less Favored Area should serve as a warning.
Finally, such criteria must not be responsive to the severity of the environmental challenges in the 
different member states in a way that would reward poor stewardship of environmental goods. In 
the best case, successful environmental protection is recompensed.
Based on these considerations – unambiguous justification, clear-cut application, and adequate 
incentive effects – four criteria appear to have the best chances of driving the allocation of the 
public goods envelopes.44 The greater member states’ agricultural, forest, Natura 2000, and or-
ganic farming areas, the greater their future envelopes.
Agricultural area: Agricultural area is loosely related to the need for funds to promote all the 
European public goods. This relationship is most straightforward when it comes to enhancing the 
amenity value of landscapes but also reasonably close for climate protection, biodiversity preser-
vation, and water management measures. Agricultural area can similarly serve as a proxy for the 
funds needed to ensure food safety and animal welfare. 
Forest area: Forest land is eligible for second pillar support and would remain so under a public 
goods envelope. The importance of responsible forest stewardship is increasingly being recog-
nized. Member states with significant forest areas can make a strong case for obtaining payments 
to enhance the environmental value of their forests. Furthermore, excessively penalizing forest 
area compared to agricultural area, given the contribution of forests to fighting climate change, 
should be avoided.
Natura 2000 area: The size of Natura 2000 areas is a suitable criterion for four reasons. First, 
it is clearly designated and registered.45 Second, member states that designate Natura 2000 areas 
pay a price as they have to fulfill strict EU requirements that limit land use. It is thus fair to reward 
such efforts. Third, the compliance costs make it unlikely that member states grant Natura 2000 
status at an excessive scale to bias CAP allocations in their favor. Fourth, if the impact of Natura 
2000 areas on CAP allocation nevertheless disposes member states to extend their Natura 2000 
areas, this would be a desirable development.
Organic farming area: Organic farming is preferable with regard to all environmental public 
goods listed above (climate, biodiversity, amenity value, flood control). It also ensures higher 
animal welfare than traditional farming and possibly produces healthier food. Importantly, the 
EU-level definition of minimum requirements for organic farming, together with a sophisticated 
certification and monitoring system, avoids abusive declarations.46
Anticipating future subsidy allocation is more difficult if the second pillar is upheld. The problem 
is that the second pillar has no clear and coherent set of objectives but mixes more or less hidden 
income support, farm productivity improvements, public goods payments, and rural develop-
ment programs unrelated to agriculture. It seems reasonable to assume that member states will 
paper over this incongruity and pretend that the second pillar is about (European) public goods. 
Distribution would thus be roughly similar but not identical to the public goods envelopes. It 
can be assumed that forest, Natura 2000, and organic farming areas will receive less weight than 
under a public goods envelope. Furthermore, one can expect future second pillar envelopes to be 
responsive to 2013 levels if the old structure is upheld. Continuity in the structure will strengthen 
the position of those who insist on continuity in the payments.18
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6. scenArios for the AllocAtion of cAP PAyments
What distribution of CAP payments would result if the criteria proposed above were to be ap-
plied? This section answers this question for several scenarios, looking at first pillar/discretionary 
envelopes, second pillar/public goods envelopes, and the total CAP budget.
6.1 FIRST PILLAR/dISCRETIonARy EnvELoPES
Table 7 shows the characteristics of the EU member states according to the criteria for the dis-
tribution of the first pillar/discretionary envelopes identified above. This enables us to appreciate 
how countries will be affected by giving greater or lower weight to a specific criterion. The table 
is also helpful in interpreting the scenario results. Due to the many scenarios and member states, 
not every single estimate can be discussed in the paper. By referring back to this data and the al-
location formulae, readers can explain individual estimates.
tAble 7: member stAtes’ chArActeristics relevAnt for future AllocAtion of first PillAr/
discretionAry enveloPes
mEmBER STATES 2013 FIRST PILLAR AgRICULTURAL AREA gdP/CAPITA
€ million % share million ha % share EU=100
Austria 752 1.65 3.19 1.85 124.7
Belgium 615 1.35 1.37 0.80 118.4
denmark 1,049 2.30 2.66 1.54 117.1
Finland 571 1.25 2.29 1.33 115.5
France 8,521 18.70 27.48 15.93 108.1
germany 5,853 12.84 16.93 9.82 115.6
greece 2,217 4.86 4.08 2.36 96.5
Ireland 1,341 2.94 4.14 2.40 143.1
Italy 4,370 9.59 12.74 7.39 99.3
Luxembourg 37 0.08 0.13 0.08 258.4
netherlands 898 1.97 1.91 1.11 132.2
Portugal 606 1.33 3.47 2.01 75.5
Spain 5,139 11.28 24.89 14.43 104.2
Sweden 771 1.69 3.12 1.81 120.2
United kingdom 3,988 8.75 16.13 9.35 118.4
eu-15 36,727 80.58 124.55 72.21 110.3
Bulgaria 742 1.63 3.05 1.77 39.2
Cyprus 53 0.12 0.15 0.08 92.5
Czech Republic 909 1.99 3.52 2.04 81.3
Estonia 101 0.22 0.91 0.53 65.0
hungary 1,319 2.89 4.23 2.45 62.6
Latvia 146 0.32 1.77 1.03 55.1
Lithuania 380 0.83 2.65 1.54 60.6
malta 5 0.01 0.01 0.01 78.9
Poland 3,045 6.68 15.48 8.97 56.1
Romania 1,620 3.55 13.75 7.97 44.9
Slovakia 388 0.85 1.94 1.12 70.7
Slovenia 144 0.32 0.49 0.28 90.8
eu-12 8,853 19.42 47.94 27.79 --19
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The next step is to combine the criteria into a formula and apply the formula to the data. Whereas 
the selection of criteria can be analytically explained, the formulae and resulting scenarios are 
inherently more arbitrary. Justification will be given for their key characteristics but many details 
– notably the values given to the parameters – are chosen to produce distinct results rather than 
being based on predictions of likelihood.
It appears reasonable to assume that the GDP per capita will enter the allocation formula as a cor-
rection to the agricultural area:47 the higher the GDP per capita, the more payments are necessary 
to keep agricultural area under utilization, to ensure a fair standard of living to farmers, and to 
appease protesting farmers and land owners. Furthermore, it can be expected that the effect of 
GDP per capita on subsidy allocation is not linear. Very rich member states will receive less and 
very poor member states more than what a linear consideration of GDP per capita would suggest. 
The allocation formula is thus constructed in the following way: 
Future envelope = a*2013 first pillar envelope + (1-a)*agricultural area*(GDP per capita)b + x
The multiplayer a determines to what extent future envelopes are dependent on 2013 first pillar 
entitlements. The exponent b assigns a weight to GDP per capita that has the desirable non-linear 
properties for values smaller than 1. The variable x ensures that the shares of all member states in 
the future first/discretionary pillar add up to 100%.48 
By varying the values of a and b, four scenarios are set up (see table 8). The conservative and the 
progressive scenarios assign high (2/3) or low (1/3) values to the multiplier a. Consequently, 
2013 first pillar entitlements weigh heavily in the conservative scenario, while agricultural area 
(together with GDP per capita) are more influential in the progressive scenario. In both cases, 
the exponent b takes on a medium value (0.5). The other two scenarios differ in the value given 
to the exponent b, while a is held constant at a medium value (1/2). In the GDP-low scenario, b 
is at 0.3, so that GDP plays a minor role, whereas b is at 0.8 in the GDP-high scenario.
tAble 8: scenArios for future AllocAtion of first PillAr /discretionAry enveloPes
SCEnARIoS a 1-a b
2013 first pillar Agricultural area and 
gdP/capita gdP/capita
Conservative 2/3 1/3 0.5
Progressive 1/3 2/3 0.5
gdP-low 1/2 1/2 0.3
gdP-high 1/2 1/2 0.8
The results of this calculation can be found in table 9. It first presents the percentage share of 
each member state in the 2013 first pillar. Then, two columns show for each scenario the member 
states’ share of the future first pillar/discretionary envelopes together with the changes compared 
to the 2013 levels. For instance, Belgium will receive 1.35% of all first pillar entitlements in 2013 
which would be reduced to 1.2% under the conservative allocation formula. This would shrink 
its envelope by 11%. The scenario in which a country does best is marked in bold (the same will 
be done in other tables reporting estimates).20
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PILLAR ConSERvATIvE PRogRESSIvE gdP-LoW gdP-hIgh
% share % share change % share change % share change % share change
Austria 1.65 1.81 10% 1.97 20% 1.84 11% 1.97 20%
Belgium 1.35 1.20 -11% 1.05 -22% 1.11 -18% 1.16 -14%
denmark 2.30 2.12 -8% 1.93 -16% 1.98 -14% 2.07 -10%
Finland 1.25 1.33 6% 1.40 12% 1.34 7% 1.40 12%
France 18.70 18.20 -3% 17.70 -5% 17.72 -5% 18.25 -2%
germany 12.84 12.23 -5% 11.60 -10% 11.69 -9% 12.21 -5%
greece 4.86 4.06 -16% 3.25 -33% 3.65 -25% 3.66 -25%
Ireland 2.94 2.95 0% 2.97 1% 2.84 -3% 3.14 7%
Italy 9.59 8.95 -7% 8.31 -13% 8.59 -10% 8.67 -10%
Luxembourg 0.08 0.10 18% 0.11 37% 0.09 13% 0.12 53%
netherlands 1.97 1.76 -11% 1.54 -22% 1.61 -18% 1.72 -13%
Portugal 1.33 1.49 12% 1.65 24% 1.61 21% 1.50 13%
Spain 11.28 12.58 12% 13.92 23% 13.11 16% 13.40 19%
Sweden 1.69 1.81 7% 1.93 14% 1.82 8% 1.94 15%
United kingdom 8.75 9.34 7% 9.94 14% 9.41 8% 9.96 14%
eu-15 80.58 79.93 -1% 79.27 -2% 78.41 -3% 81.18 1%
Bulgaria 1.63 1.47 -10% 1.31 -19% 1.50 -8% 1.26 -23%
Cyprus 0.12 0.11 -9% 0.10 -18% 0.10 -14% 0.10 -14%
Czech Republic 1.99 1.97 -1% 1.94 -3% 1.98 -1% 1.91 -4%
Estonia 0.22 0.29 32% 0.37 65% 0.35 56% 0.30 37%
hungary 2.89 2.61 -10% 2.31 -20% 2.54 -12% 2.34 -19%
Latvia 0.32 0.47 48% 0.63 96% 0.60 86% 0.49 53%
Lithuania 0.83 0.97 16% 1.10 32% 1.09 31% 0.95 14%
malta 0.01 0.01 -16% 0.01 -33% 0.01 -24% 0.01 -26%
Poland 6.68 6.78 1% 6.87 3% 7.20 8% 6.31 -6%
Romania 3.55 4.20 18% 4.86 37% 4.97 40% 3.97 12%
Slovakia 0.85 0.89 5% 0.94 10% 0.94 11% 0.87 2%
Slovenia 0.32 0.30 -4% 0.29 -8% 0.30 -5% 0.30 -6%
eu-12 19.42 20.07 3% 20.73 7% 21.59 11% 18.82 -3%
Table 10 presents the same information in a different way. Member states are ranked by the per-
centage changes they experience in their first pillar/discretionary envelopes. Three groups are 
distinguished: the winners who increase their share by at least 10%, the losers whose shares fall 
by 10% or more, and a moderately affected group in-between. The Czech Republic is abbreviated 
as CZ, Luxembourg as LU, the Netherlands as NL, and the United Kingdom as UK.21
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tAble 10: Winners And losers (by relAtive chAnges in first PillAr/discretionAry  
enveloPes)
ConSERvATIvE PRogRESSIvE gdP-LoW gdP-hIgh
Winners Winners Winners Winners
Latvia 48% Latvia 96% Latvia 87% LU 53%
Estonia 32% Estonia 65% Estonia 57% Latvia 53%
Romania 18% Romania 37% Romania 40% Estonia 37%
LU 18% LU 37% Lithuania 31% Austria 20%
Lithuania 16% Lithuania 32% Portugal 21% Spain 19%
Portugal 12% Portugal 24% Spain 17% Sweden 15%
Spain 12% Spain 23% LU 14% Lithuania 14%
Austria 10% Austria 20% Austria 12% Uk 14%
Sweden 14% Slovakia 11% Portugal 13%
moderate Uk 14% Finland 12%
Sweden 7% Finland 12% moderate Romania 12%
Uk 7% Slovakia 10% Poland 8%
Finland 6% Sweden 8% moderate
Slovakia 5% moderate Uk 8% Ireland 7%
Poland 1% Poland 3% Finland 7% Slovakia 2%
Ireland 0% Ireland 1% CZ 0% France -2%
CZ -1% CZ -3% Ireland -3% CZ -4%
France -3% France -5% France -5% germany -5%
Slovenia -4% Slovenia -8% Slovenia -5% Poland -6%
germany -5% Bulgaria -8% Slovenia -6%
Italy -7% losers germany -9%
denmark -8% germany -10% losers
Cyprus -9% Italy -13% losers Italy -10%
denmark -16% Italy -10% denmark -10%
losers Cyprus -18% hungary -12% netherlands -13%
Bulgaria -10% Bulgaria -19% Cyprus -13% Cyprus -14%
hungary -10% hungary -20% denmark -13% Belgium -14%
netherlands -11% netherlands -22% Belgium -18% hungary -19%
Belgium -11% Belgium -22% netherlands -18% Bulgaria -23%
greece -16% greece -33% malta -24% greece -25%
malta -16% malta -33% greece -25% malta -26%
Several observations can be made. The main losers are countries whose highly competitive agri-
culture or specialization in strongly subsidized products has led to disproportionately high 2013 
envelopes. This concerns Greece, Malta, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. Greek 
suffers the greatest absolute losses, and together with Malta also the greatest relative losses, as its 
2003 share greatly exceeds its share in agricultural area, while its GDP ranks slightly below EU 
average. Germany and France lose a little, while Irish receipts remain about unchanged (thanks 
to a high GDP per capita). The main winners among the EU-12 are the high-income countries 
Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the UK. Spain and Portugal also improve their posi-
tion as they have low per hectare payments under the 2013 allocation.
Some Eastern European member states lose because of their low GDP-per-capita levels. This is 
the case for Bulgaria and Hungary. In the case of other Eastern European member states, this ef-22
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fect is dominated by the gains from moving from the disadvantageous 2013 distribution towards 
a scheme that pays for agricultural area more equally (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovakia). Not much changes for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia.
Few transfers occur between the EU-15 and the EU-12. The redistribution within each group 
is much more significant and approximately neutral in the balance. Even under the GDP-low 
scenario which favors new member states most, they increase their receipts only by 11%. In a 
GDP-high scenario, new member states lose slightly.
6.2 SECond PILLAR/PUBLIC goodS EnvELoPES
Table 11 displays member states’ characteristics according to the criteria suggested for distribu-
tion of the second pillar/public goods envelopes. 







AREA FoREST AREA nATURA 2000 oRgAnIC  
FARmIng
€ million % share million ha % share million ha % share 1000 km² % share 1000 ha % share
Austria 511 4.0 3.2 1.8 4.0 2.3 18.6 1.8 372 5.2
Belgium 54 0.4 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 6.0 0.6 32 0.4
denmark 62 0.5 2.7 1.5 0.6 0.3 5.7 0.6 145 2.0
Finland 272 2.1 2.3 1.3 23.3 13.2 68.4 6.7 148 2.1
France 906 7.1 27.5 15.9 17.3 9.8 89.4 8.8 557 7.8
germany 1,131 8.9 16.9 9.8 11.1 6.3 67.1 6.6 865 12.1
greece 619 4.9 4.1 2.4 6.5 3.7 37.8 3.7 278 3.9
Ireland 307 2.4 4.1 2.4 0.7 0.4 9.5 0.9 41 0.6
Italy 1,258 9.9 12.7 7.4 11.0 6.2 84.1 8.2 1150 16.1
Luxembourg 12 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 3 0.0
netherlands 67 0.5 1.9 1.1 0.4 0.2 8.7 0.9 47 0.7
Portugal 564 4.4 3.5 2.0 3.9 2.2 25.3 2.5 233 3.3
Spain 1,041 8.2 24.9 14.4 28.2 15.9 214.8 21.1 988 13.9
Sweden 239 1.9 3.1 1.8 30.9 17.5 82.8 8.1 248 3.5
United kingdom 267 2.1 16.1 9.4 2.9 1.6 31.7 3.1 660 9.3
eu-15 7,310 57 124.5 72 141.6 80 750.6 74 5,767 81
Bulgaria 396 3.1 3.1 1.8 3.7 2.1 55.5 5.4 13 0.2
Cyprus 21 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.1 2 0.0
Czech Republic 418 3.3 3.5 2.0 2.6 1.5 16.9 1.7 312 4.4
Estonia 113 0.9 0.9 0.5 2.4 1.4 13.5 1.3 79 1.1
hungary 579 4.5 4.2 2.5 1.9 1.1 27.4 2.7 122 1.7
Latvia 151 1.2 1.8 1.0 3.1 1.8 13.3 1.3 150 2.1
Lithuania 254 2.0 2.6 1.5 2.2 1.2 11.8 1.2 120 1.7
malta 11 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0 0.0
Poland 1,850 14.5 15.5 9.0 9.2 5.2 69.3 6.8 285 4.0
Romania 1,233 9.7 13.8 8.0 6.6 3.7 31.5 3.1 131 1.8
Slovakia 317 2.5 1.9 1.1 1.9 1.1 18.0 1.8 117 1.6
Slovenia 112 0.9 0.5 0.3 1.3 0.7 11.0 1.1 29 0.4
eu-12 5,454 43 47.9 28 35.3 20 269.7 26 1,360 1923
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In order to create scenarios, one needs to distinguish between a situation where the second pillar 
structure survives and a situation where a new public goods pillar is established. Table 13 shows 
two scenarios for the second pillar. In the conservative case, 50% of the future envelope is deter-
mined by 2013 envelopes, 20% by agricultural area, and 10% each by forest, Natura 2000, and 
organic farming areas. In the progressive case, 2013 envelopes account for only 20% of future 
envelopes, while agricultural area determines 50%. The weights of forest, Natura 2000, and 
organic farming areas remain unchanged at 10%.
The table also presents four scenarios for the public goods case in which 2013 envelopes are ir-
relevant. One emphasizes agricultural area, two assign particular weight to Natura 2000/organic 
farming besides agricultural area, and the last assumes that agricultural area, Natura 2000, and 
organic farming receive equal weights. 
The weight for forest areas is held constant at 10% in all scenarios. Giving greater importance to 
forest areas is not considered as an option because this would transfer even more money to the 
main winners from reform;49 it would thus be politically unacceptable.
tAble 12: scenArios for future AllocAtion of second PillAr/Public goods enveloPes
SCEnARIoS 2013 SECond 
PILLAR
AgRICULTURAL 
AREA FoREST AREA nATURA 2000 oRgAnIC  
FARmIng
Second pillar 
conservative 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Second pillar 
progressive 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
Public goods 
area-focused 0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
Public goods 
natura-focused 0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1
Public goods 
organic-focused 0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4
Public goods 
multifunctional 0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3
In all scenarios, the allocation formula is simply the sum, for all criteria, of member states’ share 
in the criterion (see table 11) and the corresponding weight for the criterion (see table 12).50 
Table 13 presents member states’ shares of the second pillar allocation for 2013 together with the 
conservative and progressive second pillar scenarios.24
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% share share change share change
Austria 4.00 3.30 -18% 2.66 -34%
Belgium 0.43 0.52 21% 0.63 47%
denmark 0.48 0.84 75% 1.16 141%
Finland 2.13 3.52 66% 3.28 54%
France 7.10 9.37 32% 12.02 69%
germany 8.86 8.89 0% 9.18 4%
greece 4.85 4.03 -17% 3.28 -32%
Ireland 2.41 1.87 -22% 1.87 -22%
Italy 9.86 9.47 -4% 8.73 -11%
Luxembourg 0.09 0.08 -17% 0.07 -23%
netherlands 0.52 0.66 26% 0.83 60%
Portugal 4.42 3.41 -23% 2.69 -39%
Spain 8.16 12.05 48% 13.93 71%
Sweden 1.87 4.20 124% 4.18 123%
United kingdom 2.09 4.32 106% 6.50 210%
eu-15 57.27 66.53 16% 71.01 24%
Bulgaria 3.10 2.68 -14% 2.28 -27%
Cyprus 0.16 0.14 -16% 0.11 -30%
Czech Republic 3.27 2.80 -15% 2.43 -26%
Estonia 0.89 0.93 5% 0.82 -8%
hungary 4.53 3.30 -27% 2.68 -41%
Latvia 1.18 1.31 11% 1.27 7%
Lithuania 1.99 1.71 -14% 1.57 -21%
malta 0.08 0.04 -48% 0.02 -76%
Poland 14.49 10.64 -27% 8.98 -38%
Romania 9.66 7.29 -25% 6.78 -30%
Slovakia 2.49 1.92 -23% 1.51 -39%
Slovenia 0.88 0.72 -18% 0.54 -39%
eu-12 42.73 33.47 -22% 28.99 -32%25
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Table 14 provides the results for the remaining public-goods-pillar scenarios.
tAble 14: estimAtes for future AllocAtion of Public goods enveloPes
mEmBER 
STATES AREA-FoCUSEd nATURA-FoCUSEd oRgAnIC-FoCUSEd mULTIFUnCTIonAL
% share change % share change % share change % share change
Austria 2.22 -44% 2.22 -45% 3.24 -19% 2.89 -28%
Belgium 0.70 64% 0.64 50% 0.60 40% 0.59 38%
denmark 1.37 185% 1.08 124% 1.52 215% 1.28 164%
Finland 3.13 47% 4.74 123% 3.35 57% 4.35 104%
France 13.79 94% 11.64 64% 11.35 60% 10.73 51%
germany 9.37 6% 8.40 -5% 10.07 14% 9.19 4%
greece 2.78 -43% 3.19 -34% 3.24 -33% 3.36 -31%
Ireland 1.87 -22% 1.43 -41% 1.32 -45% 1.21 -50%
Italy 8.23 -16% 8.49 -14% 10.86 10% 10.15 3%
Luxembourg 0.07 -26% 0.06 -34% 0.06 -37% 0.06 -39%
netherlands 0.95 82% 0.87 68% 0.82 56% 0.81 55%
Portugal 2.21 -50% 2.35 -47% 2.58 -42% 2.55 -42%
Spain 15.19 86% 17.17 111% 15.02 84% 16.40 101%
Sweden 4.17 123% 6.06 224% 4.67 149% 5.77 208%
United 
kingdom 7.95 279% 6.07 190% 7.92 278% 6.68 219%
EU-15 74.00 29% 74.41 30% 76.61 34% 76.01 33%
Bulgaria 2.01 -35% 3.11 0% 1.53 -51% 2.43 -22%
Cyprus 0.10 -40% 0.12 -30% 0.08 -50% 0.10 -40%
Czech 
Republic 2.18 -33% 2.06 -37% 2.88 -12% 2.57 -22%
Estonia 0.75 -16% 0.99 11% 0.92 4% 1.02 15%
hungary 2.26 -50% 2.34 -48% 2.04 -55% 2.16 -52%
Latvia 1.24 4% 1.32 11% 1.56 32% 1.51 27%
Lithuania 1.48 -25% 1.37 -31% 1.53 -23% 1.44 -28%
malta 0.00 -94% 0.00 -95% 0.00 -96% 0.00 -96%
Poland 7.88 -46% 7.22 -50% 6.39 -56% 6.45 -56%
Romania 6.45 -33% 4.98 -48% 4.61 -52% 4.24 -56%
Slovakia 1.23 -50% 1.43 -43% 1.39 -44% 1.47 -41%
Slovenia 0.42 -52% 0.66 -25% 0.46 -48% 0.60 -31%
EU-12 26.00 -39% 25.59 -40% 23.39 -45% 23.99 -44%26
ECIPE WORKING PAPER
No. 08/2009
Table 15 ranks the winners (whose shares in payments increase by at least 10%), the losers (whose 
shares fall by at least 10%), and the moderately affected group in-between. 
tAble 15: Winners And losers (by relAtive chAnges in second PillAr/Public goods enve-
loPes)








Winners Winners Winners Winners Winners Winners
Sweden 124% Uk 210% Uk 279% Sweden 224% Uk 278% Uk 219%
Uk 106% denmark 141% denmark 185% Uk 190% denmark 215% Sweden 208%
denmark 75% Sweden 123% Sweden 123% denmark 124% Sweden 149% denmark 164%
Finland 66% Spain 71% France 94% Finland 123% Spain 84% Finland 104%
Spain 48% France 69% Spain 86% Spain 111% France 60% Spain 101%
France 32% nL 60% nL 82% nL 68% Finland 57% nL 55%
nL 26% Finland 54% Belgium 64% France 64% nL 56% France 51%
Belgium 21% Belgium 47% Finland 47% Belgium 50% Belgium 40% Belgium 38%
Latvia 11% Latvia 11% Latvia 32% Latvia 27%
moderate moderate Estonia 11% germany 14% Estonia 15%
moderate Latvia 7% germany 6% Italy 10%
Estonia 5% germany 4% Latvia 4% moderate moderate
germany 0% Estonia -8% Bulgaria 0% moderate germany 4%
Italy -4% losers germany -5% Estonia 4% Italy 3%
losers Estonia -16%
losers Italy -11% Italy -16% losers losers losers
Bulgaria -14% Lithuania -21% Ireland -22% Italy -14% CZ -12% CZ -22%
Lithuania -14% Ireland -22% Lithuania -25% Slovenia -25% Austria -19% Bulgaria -22%
CZ -15% LU -23% LU -26% Cyprus -30% Lithuania -23% Austria -28%
Cyprus -16% CZ -26% Romania -33% Lithuania -31% greece -33% Lithuania -28%
greece -17% Bulgaria -27% CZ -33% LU -34% LU -37% greece -31%
LU -17% Romania -30% Bulgaria -35% greece -34% Portugal -42% Slovenia -31%
Austria -18% Cyprus -30% Cyprus -40% CZ -37% Slovakia -44% LU -39%
Slovenia -18% greece -32% greece -43% Ireland -41% Ireland -45% Cyprus -40%
Ireland -22% Austria -34% Austria -44% Slovakia -43% Slovenia -48% Slovakia -41%
Portugal -23% Poland -38% Poland -46% Austria -45% Cyprus -50% Portugal -42%
Slovakia -23% Slovenia -39% hungary -50% Portugal -47% Bulgaria -51% Ireland -50%
Romania -25% Portugal -39% Portugal -50% Romania -48% Romania -52% hungary -52%
Poland -27% Slovakia -39% Slovakia -50% hungary -48% hungary -55% Poland -56%
hungary -27% hungary -41% Slovenia -52% Poland -50% Poland -56% Romania -56%
malta -48% malta -76% malta -94% malta -95% malta -96% malta -96%
Some EU 15 member states see their envelopes sharply reduced. This applies to Greece, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Austria, and Portugal. But most experience even stronger increases, namely 
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and the UK. Germany 
and Italy gain moderately under an organic-focused scenario but may lose somewhat in other 
scenarios. 
Almost all new member states lose in all second pillar and public goods scenarios. The only excep-27
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tion is Latvia and Estonia. Latvia is the only consistent winner, especially in the organic-focused 
or multifunctional cases. Estonia also benefits, except under the progressive second pillar and the 
area-focused public goods scenarios.
Transfers from the new to the old member states are remarkable. The old member states increase 
their share by 16% (24%) in the conservative (progressive) scenario and by up to 34% in the 
organic-focused public goods scenario.
It is important to note that this distribution will change as new member states with relatively 
small Natura 2000 and organic farming areas catch up. However, they will never increase these 
areas to such an extent that they will obtain the 43% of any future second/public goods pillar that 
they are currently being granted under the second pillar.
6.3 ToTAL CAP EnvELoPES
The implications for the future allocation of total national CAP envelopes can be seen by com-
bining the (sub-)scenarios for the first/discretionary and the second/public goods pillars. Three 
scenarios for the future CAP budget allocation are defined in table 16. In the first case, the old 
structure is maintained and both the first and the second pillar are distributed according to the 
respective conservative scenarios (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2). Accordingly, this CAP scenario is 
labeled conservative. 
The other two cases envision more ambitious reform. It is assumed that the structure is reformed, 
so that the second pillar is replaced by a public goods pillar. These CAP scenarios are dubbed 
area-focused and multifunctional, respectively, because the public goods pillar is distributed once 
according to the area-focused and once according to the multifunctional scenario. The discretion-
ary pillar is assumed to be distributed progressively, giving greater weight to agricultural area and 
GDP per capita and less to 2013 entitlements.
Creating scenarios for total CAP envelopes requires determining which share of the CAP budget 
will be spent on which pillar. It is assumed that two thirds of the CAP remains in the first pillar 
in the conservative CAP scenario, that is, if the structure is not reformed and payments for both 
pillars are distributed conservatively. If reform turns out to be more dynamic, leading to a new 
structure with a progressively distributed discretionary pillar, it is assumed that two thirds of the 
CAP budgets are spent on the public goods pillar.51
tAble 16: scenArios for future AllocAtion of the cAP budget









Conservative conservative conservative  2/3  1/3
Area-focused progressive area-focused  1/3  2/3
multifunctional progressive multifunctional  1/3  2/3
Taking the estimates from tables 9, 13, and 14 and combining them with the weights from table 
16 leads to the estimates in table 17.28
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ShARE ConSERvATIvE AREA-FoCUSEd mULTIFUnCTIonAL
% share change % share change % share change
Austria 2.16 2.31 7% 2.14 -1% 2.59 20%
Belgium 1.15 0.97 -15% 0.82 -29% 0.74 -35%
denmark 1.90 1.69 -11% 1.56 -18% 1.49 -22%
Finland 1.44 2.06 43% 2.55 77% 3.37 133%
France 16.16 15.26 -6% 15.09 -7% 13.05 -19%
germany 11.97 11.12 -7% 10.11 -16% 9.99 -17%
greece 4.86 4.05 -17% 2.94 -40% 3.32 -32%
Ireland 2.82 2.59 -8% 2.24 -21% 1.80 -36%
Italy 9.65 9.12 -5% 8.26 -14% 9.54 -1%
Luxembourg 0.08 0.09 7% 0.08 -2% 0.07 -11%
netherlands 1.65 1.39 -16% 1.15 -30% 1.05 -36%
Portugal 2.01 2.13 6% 2.02 1% 2.25 12%
Spain 10.59 12.40 17% 14.76 39% 15.57 47%
Sweden 1.73 2.61 51% 3.42 98% 4.49 159%
United kingdom 7.29 7.66 5% 8.61 18% 7.77 6%
eu-15 75.48 75.46 0% 75.75 0% 77.10 2%
Bulgaria 1.95 1.87 -4% 1.78 -9% 2.06 5%
Cyprus 0.13 0.12 -8% 0.10 -24% 0.10 -24%
Czech Republic 2.27 2.24 -1% 2.10 -8% 2.36 4%
Estonia 0.37 0.50 37% 0.62 69% 0.80 119%
hungary 3.25 2.84 -13% 2.28 -30% 2.21 -32%
Latvia 0.51 0.75 48% 1.03 103% 1.22 138%
Lithuania 1.09 1.21 12% 1.36 25% 1.32 22%
malta 0.03 0.02 -23% 0.01 -79% 0.00 -82%
Poland 8.39 8.06 -4% 7.54 -10% 6.59 -21%
Romania 4.89 5.23 7% 5.92 21% 4.45 -9%
Slovakia 1.21 1.23 2% 1.13 -6% 1.29 7%
Slovenia 0.44 0.44 1% 0.38 -14% 0.50 14%
eu-12 24.52 24.54 0% 24.25 -1% 22.90 -7%
Table 18 ranks the member states by the changes in their total CAP receipts and sorts them into 
groups of winners, losers, and moderately affected countries.29
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tAble 18: Winners And losers (by relAtive chAnges in totAl cAP PAyments)
conservAtive AreA-focused multifunctionAl
Winners Winners Winners
Sweden 51% Latvia 103% Sweden 159%
Latvia 48% Sweden 98% Latvia 138%
Finland 43% Finland 77% Finland 133%
Estonia 37% Estonia 69% Estonia 119%
Spain 17% Spain 39% Spain 47%
Lithuania 12% Lithuania 25% Lithuania 22%
Romania 21% Austria 20%
moderate Uk 18% Slovenia 14%
Romania 7% Portugal 12%
Luxembourg 7% moderate
Austria 7% Portugal 1% moderate
Portugal 6% Austria -1% Slovakia 7%
Uk 5% Luxembourg -2% Uk 6%
Slovakia 2% Slovakia -6% Bulgaria 5%
Slovenia 1% France -7% CZ 4%
CZ -1% CZ -8% Italy -1%
Poland -4% Bulgaria -9% Romania -9%
Bulgaria -4%
Italy -5% losers losers
France -6% Poland -10% Luxembourg -11%
germany -7% Slovenia -14% germany -17%
Cyprus -8% Italy -14% France -19%
Ireland -8% germany -16% Poland -21%
denmark -18% denmark -22%
losers Ireland -21% Cyprus -24%
denmark -11% Cyprus -24% greece -32%
hungary -13% Belgium -29% hungary -32%
Belgium -15% hungary -30% Belgium -35%
netherlands -16% netherlands -30% netherlands -36%
greece -17% greece -40% Ireland -36%
malta -23% malta -79% malta -82%30
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Table 19 presents the gains or losses in € million that will result for each member state because 
of the changes in the distribution key. It is assumed that the post-2013 CAP budget that will be 
distributed to national envelopes amounts to € 55 billion (roughly the current size of the CAP).
tAble 19: cAP scenArios Absolute gAins
conservAtive AreA-focused multifunctionAl
Winners Winners Winners
Spain 996 Spain 2294 Spain 2738
Sweden 482 Sweden 931 Sweden 1516
Finland 339 United kingdom 725 Finland 1058
United kingdom 204 Finland 609 Latvia 388
Romania 187 Romania 566 United kingdom 261
Latvia 134 Latvia 288 Estonia 240
Austria 79 Lithuania 148 Austria 233
Estonia 75 Estonia 139 Portugal 135
Lithuania 70 Portugal 8 Lithuania 131
Portugal 67 Bulgaria 58
Slovakia 14 losers Czech Republic 46
Luxembourg 3 Luxembourg -1 Slovakia 44
Slovenia 2 malta -12 Slovenia 34
Austria -13
losers Cyprus -17 losers
malta -3 Slovenia -34 Luxembourg -5
Cyprus -6 Slovakia -41 malta -12
Czech Republic -18 Bulgaria -95 Cyprus -17
Bulgaria -42 Czech Republic -97 Italy -61
Belgium -95 Belgium -181 Belgium -222
denmark -116 denmark -190 denmark -226
Ireland -127 netherlands -277 Romania -242
netherlands -143 Ireland -324 netherlands -329
Poland -179 Poland -465 Ireland -565
hungary -227 hungary -535 hungary -571
Italy -287 France -586 greece -846
greece -445 Italy -765 Poland -990
germany -470 germany -1022 germany -1089
France -494 greece -1058 France -1707
The biggest percentage gains go to Finland and Sweden as well as to the Baltic republics. Spain 
obtains by far the greatest absolute gains. Other countries that stand to gain (though not always 
under all scenarios) are Austria, Portugal, the UK, and Romania. 
Luxembourg, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic are affected only by minor changes (often with 
changing signs in different scenarios). Slovenia and Slovakia win in the multifunctional but lose 
in the area-focused scenario.
Clear losers are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, and Poland. Especially large changes occur under the multifunctional 31
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scenario: Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Malta would lose more than 
30% of their CAP receipts.
There are only very moderate transfers between the EU-15 and the EU-12 countries. The expla-
nation for this is that the shift from the first/discretionary to the second/public goods pillar im-
proves the position of EU-12 countries, while the changes of the distribution key for the second/
public goods pillar reduces their share.
7. conclusions
The CAP needs fundamental reform indeed. The traditional core of the first pillar, market inter-
vention and coupled subsidies, have long been discredited. But shifting money to the SFP is not 
the solution – instead, the SFP should itself be phased out. In addition, the various instruments 
conflated in the second pillar need to be reassessed. Only some of them are in principle appropri-
ate to promote (European) public goods, and even fewer are actually implemented to efficiently 
attain this end.
The necessary overhaul could best be realized by discarding the old two-pillar structure and 
replacing it with a discretionary and a public goods pillar. The basic idea of this structure is that 
countries should enjoy flexibility in how they phase out inefficient policies, while the EU reform 
debate should not be clogged with the contentious details of phase-out strategies. For instance, 
progressive modulation, co-financing of the SFP, and reform of the Less Favored Area scheme 
are all improvements compared to the status quo but should not be attempted in the post-2013 
reforms. Instead of amending or scaling back inefficient policies one by one, they should all be 
grouped in one envelope that is subject to continuous reductions.
A third topic of the reform, besides instruments and structure, is the distribution of the CAP 
budget into national envelopes. Many member states, especially but not only from the EU-12, 
urge for the redistribution of national envelopes under the post-2013 CAP. This distributional 
question is linked to the other two reform topics. If far-reaching changes of the instruments 
and the structure of the CAP are undertaken, this will make a more thorough re-distribution 
of CAP payments across member states more likely. By the same token, distributional quarrels 
between governments and populist appeals to national interests are among the chief obstacles to 
any efficiency-enhancing reform. It is therefore critical to understand the distributional effects 
of reform and to come to grips with the future CAP allocation.
This requires identifying criteria that can inform the future distribution of CAP payments. The 
paper suggests several such criteria whose case can convincingly be made. In the case of the first/
discretionary pillar, these are 2013 first pillar envelopes, agricultural area, and GDP per capita. 
The distribution of future public goods envelopes would probably be determined by agricultural 
area, forest area, Natura 2000 area, and organic farming area. If the second pillar is upheld, its 
envelopes can be expected to be also shaped by 2013 second pillar entitlements. 
By combining these criteria into allocation formulae, member states’ future envelopes can be 
estimated. Some results from the many scenarios considered in this paper shall be highlighted. It 
can be seen that several traditional defenders of the CAP are indeed likely to lose from reform. 
This concerns Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, and Italy. However, Italy may approximately 
preserve its share under the multifunctional scenario that strongly rewards Natura 2000 areas and 
organic farming. If reform is unavoidable, the Italian motto should be: the more, the better. By 
contrast, the multifunctional scenario is especially undesirable for Belgium, France, and Ireland 
(compared to their results under other scenarios).32
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Other countries that defend the status quo would – surprisingly – win from reform. This is espe-
cially striking in the case of Spain that would see both its envelopes increased under any reform 
scenario and that would reap the greatest absolute gains of all member states. Finland would get 
the third highest increase under all scenarios just after Sweden and Latvia. For both countries, the 
benefits would be greater, the bolder the reform. To a lesser extent, this also applies to reform-
averse Portugal and Austria.
The opposite case exists as well. Denmark and the Netherlands, who favor CAP reform (albeit 
less strongly than the UK and Sweden), are likely to be faced with a decreasing share in CAP pay-
ments. The same is true for Germany which may turn into a CAP reform promoter in the run-up 
to 2013 (due to its interest in limiting wasteful expenditures being the main net contributor to the 
EU budget, its rather liberal convictions in economic policy, and its commitment to environmen-
tal protection). Such countries need to engage in a broad-scale debate early on, so that as many 
actors as possible understand what is at stake, and commit to reform in the name of the larger 
benefits to European integration, before the street protests and behind-the-door deals come to 
dominate the final stages of negotiations. 
A special though similar case is the UK. This country will likely increase its share in CAP payments 
but may nevertheless indirectly lose from CAP reform. The hidden drawback is that the UK may 
be forced to sacrifice its budget rebate. In the budget review consultations, most stakeholders 
expressed a preference for the removal of all ad hoc/historical corrections and many would like 
to avoid the introduction of a generalized correction mechanism in their place. Such a change will 
become harder to resist if the CAP becomes more efficient and is being distributed according to 
rational criteria.
Sweden endorses CAP reform in line with its liberal economic approach and pro-environmental 
stance. It appears not to be aware of a more material incentive: it could be the greatest relative 
winner when it comes to national CAP envelopes.
The Eastern European member states are very heterogeneously concerned. The Baltic Republics 
stand to gain substantially from CAP reform, most so under the ambitious multifunctional CAP 
scenario. All other Eastern European member states can expect to gain only moderately (except 
for Romania in a scenario that heavily compensates agricultural area) – or they even risk to lose. 
During the next financial framework, most Eastern European member states would probably be 
served best by advocating fundamental CAP reform while minimizing CAP expenditures. 
The logic behind such a move is that this would boost their receipts from European structural 
funds. The contributions to the Budget Review consultation have made it clear that many stake-
holders want to abolish EU payments to poor regions in not-so-poor member states, keeping only 
an inter-state transfer mechanism to the benefit of the poorest member states. And even among 
those who wish to maintain the possibility to tap structural funds for all regions, most agree that 
these funds should be concentrated more strongly on less-developed member states and regions. 
Eastern European member states therefore have a material interest to back radical and principled 
CAP reform in the spirit of the Budget Review. Ambitious changes in the notoriously rigid CAP, 
driven by the leitmotif of promoting European public goods, would strengthen the case for fo-
cusing European solidarity transfers on poor (Eastern European) member states and ending the 
inefficient web of cross-subsidies characteristic of current structural and cohesion policies. 
The more Eastern European member states expand their share in the structural funds, the more 
attractive it becomes to reduce the CAP budget in order to free up money for structural funds. 
Even if Eastern European member states are surprisingly successful in moving towards a flat rate 33
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approach, they will be much better off by shifting the money to the structural funds instead. A 
further advantageous side effect would arise if CAP reform facilitates the move towards an ex-
clusively GNI-based EU budget (as Eastern European member states apparently have no interest 
in the exceptions for certain net contributors). 
The hope is that better targeting of EU subsidies at European public goods and sound co-financing 
will reduce the importance of national envelopes in the future. The final winner would be the EU.
If you wish to be informed of future ECIPE studies and the events on agriculture, please send an 
e-mail to info@ecipe.org asking that your name be put on the agriculture list.
Annex
The data for the tables has been taken from the following sources:
2013 first pillar envelopes: Council Regulation (EC) 73/2009.
2013 second pillar envelopes: Commission Decision 2007/383/EC.
GDP per capita: Eurostat, 2008 forecast (EU27=100) in Purchasing Power Standards.
Agricultural area: Eurostat, agrarea (arable land, permanent grassland, permanent crops, and 
kitchen gardens), 2007.
Forest: UNECE, forest & other wooded land, 2005.
Natura 2000: DG Environment, Natura 2000 Barometer, Terrestrial Special Protection Areas and 
Terrestrial Sites of Community Importance, June 2008.
Organic farming: www.organic-europe.net, 2007. 
literAture
BirdLife International. 2009. Could Do Better: How Is EU Rural Development Policy Delivering 
for Biodiversity?
Brady, Mark, Konrad Kellermann, Christoph Sahrbacher, Ladislav Jelinek, and Antonello Lobi-
anco. 2007. Environmental Impacts of Decoupled Agricultural Support: A Regional Assessment: 
Swedish Institute for Food and Agricultural Economics Working Paper 2007:1.
Brunner, Ariel, and Harry Huyton. 2008. The Environmental Impact of European Union Agri-
cultural Subsidies in the World Trade Organization Green Box: Mimeo.
Chau, Nancy H., and Harry De Gorter. 2005. Disentangling the Consequences of Direct Pay-
ment Schemes in Agriculture on Fixed Costs, Exit Decisions, and Output. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 87 (5):1174-1181.
Commission Regulation. 2004. Commission Regulation No 796/2004 laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and 
control system provided for in of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common 
rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain 
support schemes for farmers.34
ECIPE WORKING PAPER
No. 08/2009
Council of the European Union. 2005. Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 
2005 on Support for Rural Development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Develop-
ment (EAFRD).
European Commission. 2009a. Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income in the European 
Union 2008-2015: Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development.
———. 2009b. Statement of Estimates of the European Commission for the Financial  Year 2010: 
Financial Programming 2010-2013.
European Council. 1999. Council Regulation (EC) No 1268/1999 on Community support for 
pre-accession measures for agriculture and rural development in the applicant countries of cen-
tral and eastern Europe in the pre-accession period.
———. 2003. Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing 
common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing 
certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 
1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, 
(EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001.
European Court of Auditors. 2008. Is Cross Compliance an Effective Policy?: Special Report No. 
8/2008.
Grethe, Harald. 2007. High Animal Welfare Standards in the EU and International Trade - How 
to Prevent Potential ‘Low Animal Welfare Havens’? Food Policy 32:315-333.
Institute for European Environmental Policy. 2007. Final Report for the Study on HNV Indica-
tors for Evaluation.
Kaditi, Eleni, and Johan F. M. Swinnen, eds. 2006. Trade Agreements, Multifunctionality and EU Ag-
riculture. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Mantino, Francesco. 2003. The Second Pillar: Allocation of Resources, Programming and Man-
agement of Rural Development Policy: Conference Paper Prepared for the Land Use Policy 
Group Conference on ‘Future Policies for Rural Europe - 2006 and beyond’, Brussels, March 
2003.
Nunez-Ferrer, Jorge. 2008. Can Reforming Own Resources Foster Policy Quality?: SIEPS Report 
2008/3.
OECD. 2008. Environmental Performance of Agriculture in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD.
Ramboll Management. 2007. Study to Assess the Administrative Burden on Farms Arising from 
the CAP.
Velazquez, Beatriz. 2008. The Single Payment Scheme in the Impact Assessment of the CAP 
‘Health Check’: Paper prepared for the 109th EAAE Seminar ‘The CAP after the Fischler Re-
form’, Vicerbo, Nov. 20-21, 2008.
Vercammen, James. 2007. Farm Bankruptcy Risk as a Link between Direct Payments and Agri-
cultural Investment. European Review of Agricultural Economics 34 (4):479-500.
Witzke, Harald von, and Steffen Noleppa. 2007. Agricultural and Trade Policy Reform and In-
equality: The Distributive Effects of Direct Payments to German Farmers under the EU’s New 
Common Agricultural Policy: Humboldt-Universität Working Paper No. 79/2007.35
ECIPE WORKING PAPER
No. 08/2009
Witzke, Harald von, Steffen Noleppa, and Gerald Schwarz. 2008. Global Agricultural Market 
Trends and Their Impacts on European Union Agriculture: Humboldt Universität Working Paper 
No. 84/2008.
footnotes
I am grateful to Ariel Brunner, Fredrik Erixon, kaley hart, Bettina Rudloff and Jack Thurston for helpful  1. 
comments on earlier drafts. I am also indebted to member state and European Commission officials who 
shared their thoughts with me. Special thanks go to Frédéric Peyrot for double-checking all data and 
calculations, as well as to Elizabeth hayes for excellent proofreading. The project has been supported by 
the german marshall Fund of the United States.
See the roughly 300 stakeholder contributions of the consultations conducted by the directorate-general  2. 
Budget in 2008 as well as the commissioned scientific studies at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/
index_en.htm.
Farm ministers passed a minor reform, dubbed ‘health Check’, in 2008, whose major effect is to dissipate  3. 
serious reform ambitions arising from within Europe for the duration of the current financial framework. 
Also, the World Trade organization (WTo) will not deliver the external stimulus that has been influential 
in the past landmark reforms of 1992 and 2003: the prospects for concluding the doha Round are 
uncertain – and the draft agreement on the negotiating table falls short of requiring fundamental CAP 
adaptations if it were to be passed. The main change would be the eventual removal of export subsidies.
Already in 2008, the European Commission has hosted a conference to present the results of the civil  4. 
society dialogue and scientific reports conducted as an initial step of the Budget Review. This process is 
preparing the ‘real’ budget negotiations by systematically evaluating both EU spending and financing. By 
the end of 2009, the Commission intends to reveal the recommendations it has derived so far, followed 
by a communication on CAP reform in summer 2010.
See the speech by mariann Fischer Boel, the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural development, at  5. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECh/09/279&format=hTmL&aged=0&l
anguage=En&guiLanguage=en.
new member states thus received a much larger share in the so-called second than in first pillar  6. 
payments. See Section 5.
For instance, a generalized correction mechanism could be introduced into the gnI-based budget  7. 
contributions, and subsequently be phased out in step with reductions of wasteful CAP subsidies. See 
also nunez-Ferrer (2008) for a proposal on a EU financing scheme that is responsive to the allocation of 
direct payments under the CAP.
See European Commission (2009b). 8. 
See Section 5.2, which also argues that rural development is not a reasonable objective for the CAP. 9. 
Some of them increase agricultural production while others decrease it. It is difficult to quantify these  10. 
effects and estimate net changes in production due to the SFP. But even if their net effect is zero, they 
still lower economic efficiency.
See vercammen (2007). 11. 
See Chau and de gorter (2005). Witzke and noleppa (2007) show that most incorporated farms in  12. 
germany would operate at a loss without the SFP. 
The British department for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (defra) estimates the average cost of  13. 
processing an individual SFP claim in 2007-08 at £742. See http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.
com/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090126/text/90126w0009.htm. 
See Ramboll management (2007). 14. 
See oECd (2008). 15. 
Brady et al. (2007) find that decoupled payments do not lead to consistently better environmental  16. 
outcomes than the coupled payments that have long been criticized for their negative environmental 36
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effects. kaditi and Swinnen (2006) equally find regionally divergent and mixed environmental effects of 
untargeted policies.
See European Court of Auditors (2008). See also Brunner and huyton (2008) and www.ccat.wur.nl. 17. 
The same can be said of those elements of cross compliance that aim to ensure food safety and animal  18. 
welfare.
See European Commission (2009a) and Witzke, noleppa, and Schwarz (2008). 19. 
See velazquez (2008). 20. 
See velazquez (2008). See also the list of hundreds of farm-subsidy-millionaires at www.farmsubsidy.org. 21. 
The health Check reform has extended the range of instruments eligible for first pillar funding (through  22. 
Art. 68 of Council Regulation (EC) no 73/2009), further blurring the distinction between the two pillars.
So far, the possibility of ‘voluntary modulation’ is tightly restrained. 23. 
one such safeguard should be that coupled payments must at least not exceed the 2013 level. Farm  24. 
modernization subsidies that do not efficiently serve a public good and are thus not illegible under the 
public goods envelope should remain below a threshold that prevents significant increases compared 
to 2013 levels (at least in those countries that spend strongly on this item in 2013). And all farm 
modernization programs should have to comply with stricter conditions that prevent environmental harm.
Introducing co-financing for the SFP – albeit an improvement in itself – appears not desirable because  25. 
it would complicate negotiations. however, the possibility to top up the SFP, as discussed below, would 
also share the financial burden between the EU and the member states.
Re-starting the debate about a bond scheme is not advisable for similar reasons. SFP entitlements can  26. 
already be sold, and they should receive an end date through the next reform. The SFP comes so close to 
a bond that the discussion about a new bond instrument would unnecessarily complicate matters.
This is not to dismiss the very valuable work on enhancing transparency about payments conducted in  27. 
the first place by www.farmsubsidy.org. debunking the myth that the SFP is needed to help small farmers 
should not primarily lead to claims for different repartition but for the abolition of the SFP.
one such form of non-SFP income support that member states could employ to soften the transition  28. 
and appease protest is the Less Favored Area scheme. This scheme has no justification under a public 
goods envelope: more targeted programs that preserve environmentally friendly farming in areas where 
land abandonment would be ecologically undesirable are preferable. In this sense, the long-standing 
discussion of reform of the Less Favored Area payments points into the wrong direction, both by 
legitimizing an instrument that should be removed and by restraining member states to employ it for 
political ends to facilitate overall CAP reform.
See BirdLife International (2009). 29. 
For instance, agri-environmental payments can be coupled to good practices in the production of a  30. 
specific crop. This will distort production if the payments are high and compliance cheap.
See Sections 3.3 and 5.1 on the current imbalances. Future leveling will result from equalizing per  31. 
hectare payments across member states and among farmers within the same member state (as the 
historic SFP model recedes).
See European Council (2003). 32. 
For Bulgaria and Romania, where the SFP will be fully phased in only in 2016, data has been taken for the  33. 
year 2015 as an approximation of their ‘time-discounted’ entitlements/bargaining power in 2013.
The argument that agricultural area is a useful proxy for the delivery of public goods is made in the next  34. 
section.
After 2013, structural funds will probably become even more beneficial to Eastern European countries  35. 
with low gdP per capita, compensating them for lesser CAP receipts. See Section 7.
See the next section. 36. 
See Council of the European Union (2005). 37. 
See Commission Regulation (2004) and European Council (1999). 38. 37
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The health Check reform has affected this distribution only slightly. 39. 
The term ‘public goods’ is used broadly. Agricultural research and development are not mentioned here.  40. 
If research is financed through the CAP, it should not be part of the national envelopes but be allocated 
according to scientific excellence.
See grethe (2007). 41. 
more fine-grained criteria would be conceivable if EU policies prescribe for which objectives the money  42. 
should be used. For instance, a country could receive extra funds dedicated to flood management if its 
flood management efforts significantly affect other member states. or it could get specific funding for 
protecting migratory birds.
See Institute for European Environmental Policy (2007) on the challenges inherent in indicators for high  43. 
nature value farmland.
See also mantino (2003). he considers natura 2000 and organic farming but not agricultural area as  44. 
criteria linked to environmental public goods. An important difference is that he accounts for agricultural 
employment, employment/unemployment rates, and gdP per capita in order to respond to economic/
social needs. Since the present paper assumes that environmental services will be the key objective of 
the future second/public goods pillar, such factors play no role.
See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/index_en.htm. 45. 
See Council Regulation (EC) no 834/2007. 46. 
‘gdP per capita’ is understood as deviation from EU average (EU=100) as shown in table 7. The Sapard  47. 
program for the new member states has also used gdP deviations as a correction factor to agricultural 
area (and agricultural employment). See Article 78 of Commission Regulation (2004).
The share of subsidies that is not allocated by the first two components of the formula is distributed  48. 
across member states according to their share based on the first two components. The problem of non-
allocated shares arises because gdP per capita is not expressed as a percentage share (like 2013 first 
pillar entitlements and agricultural area) and because it is being exponentiated.
Spain, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia – see Section 6.3. 49. 
For instance, the Austrian share in the conservative scenario can be calculated in the following way:   50. 
4.0*0.5+1.8*0.2+2.3*0.1+1.8*0.1+5.2*0.1.
This difference in the allocation of funds to the two pillars may appear excessive. After all, the public  51. 
goods pillar will be narrower in scope than the second pillar; it would thus receive less money if funding 
per instrument remains unchanged. The underlying assumption is that funds will be radically re-allocated 
across instruments under the area-focused and multifunctional CAP scenarios. one also has to take into 
account that these values are averages over the next financial period. An average of 1/3 for discretionary 
pillar payments can be attained even if initial payments are higher provided that they fall below 1/3 at the 
end of the next financial period (presumably 2020).